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Transitional Justice Delayed Is Not Transitional
Justice Denied: Contemporary Confrontation of Japanese
Human Experimentation During World War 1I
Through a People's Tribunal
Zachary D. Kaufman*
Human experimentation by Japanese officials during World War II pre-
sents one of the most horrifying instances of state-sponsored brutality. Since the
end of the war, however, the Japanese government has not officially recognized
that the atrocities occurred, nor has the U.S. government acknowledged its
postwar role in sheltering the perpetrators of these heinous acts. This appalling
yet unaddressed affair therefore demands international attention. Because typi-
cal transitional justice options are unavailable or inappropriate, the solution
may lie in an innovative civil society initiative: a people's tribunal that could
pressure the Japanese and U.S. governments to bring meaningful closure to this
tragedy.
I begin this Comment by explaining the need for contemporary confronta-
tion of Japanese human experimentation during World War II. I then make the
case that a people's tribunal is a compelling transitional justice option for ad-
dressing these crimes. I argue that a people's tribunal could raise public aware-
ness about these offenses and shame the relevant authorities into action. I fur-
ther argue that, in any event, other transitional justice options would not be
suitable for this case. I conclude by drawing some lessons from this case study
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about the promise and perils of attempting to promote justice and accountabil-
ity for past atrocities.
I. THE MODERN NEED To ADDRESS JAPANESE WARTIME HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION
Both the historical and political background of Japanese human experi-
mentation and recent geopolitical developments in East Asia make this issue
particularly crucial to address today.
A. Historical and Political Background
During World War II, Japanese officials experimented on thousands of ci-
vilians and Allied soldiers, possibly including U.S. prisoners of war.' The most
notorious research was conducted in Manchuria by the Imperial Japanese
Army's Unit 731, led by Lieutenant General Shiro Ishii.2 These experiments,
sometimes referred to as the "Asian Auschwitz," included vivisections, dissec-
tions, weapons testing, starvation, dehydration, poisoning, extreme tempera-
ture and pressure testing, and deliberate infection with numerous deadly dis-
eases. 3 Had the war continued, the Japanese planned to use the biological
weapons developed from these experiments to attack the U.S. military in the
Pacific and possibly even the west coast of the United States itself.4
1. Sources differ on whether Americans were among the victims of Unit 731. See
GARY K. REYNOLDS, U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN AMERICAN CITIZENS
CAPTURED AND INTERNED BY JAPAN IN WORLD WAR II: THE ISSUE OF COMPEN-
SATION BY JAPAN 13-19 (Cong. Research Serv. Doc. No. RL3o6o6, 2OO1),
http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL3o6o6.pdf; see also SHELDON H. HARRIS, FACTO-
RIES OF DEATH: JAPANESE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, 1932-45, AND THE AMERICAN
COVER-UP 113-31 (rev. ed. 2002).
2. Unit 731 is discussed in various sources. See, e.g., YVES BEIGBEDER, JUDGING WAR
CRIMINALS: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 53, 72-74 (1999); JOHN L.
GINN, SUGAMO PRISON, TOKYO: AN ACCOUNT OF THE TRIAL AND SENTENCING OF
JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS IN 1948, BY A U.S. PARTICIPANT 242-45 (1992); HAL
GOLD, UNIT 731 TESTIMONY: JAPAN'S WARTIME HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION PRO-
GRAM (1966); HARRIS, supra note 1; YUKI TANAKA, HIDDEN HORRORS: JAPANESE
WAR CRIMES IN WORLD WAR II 135-65 (1996); PETER WILLIAMS & DAVID WAL-
LACE, UNIT 731: JAPAN'S SECRET BIOLOGICAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR 11 (1989);
John Saar, Japan Accused of WWII Germ Deaths, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1976, at Al.
Declassified U.S. government documents relating to Japanese medical experimen-
tation during World War II can be found online. See The Nazi War Crimes and
Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, The Na-
tional Archives, http://www.archives.gov/iwg (last visited Apr. 15, 20o8).
3. Japanese human experimenters injected some of their subjects with bubonic
plague, cholera, anthrax, smallpox, gangrene, streptococcus bacteria, and syphilis.
See generally sources cited supra note 2.
4. See GOLD supra note 2, at 86-92.
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When the war ended, the U.S. government offered immunity and other in-
centives-including money, food, and entertainment-to over 3,600 Japanese
government agents, physicians, and scientists involved in these experiments.
Recently declassified U.S. government documents and testimony from Japanese
involved in or knowledgeable about the experiments reveal that the U.S. gov-
ernment was interested in how the work of Ishii and other Japanese, however
unethical, could be of use to the U.S. military.5 Senior U.S. officials felt that ob-
taining data from the experiments was more valuable than bringing to justice
the individuals involved because the information could be used to advance the
United States' own weapons development program. U.S. officials were also con-
cerned about preventing other countries, particularly the Soviet Union, from
obtaining the data.6 This strategy was possible because, unlike Josef Mengele
and his Nazi cohorts who performed similar experiments on human guinea pigs
but who "were too well known for their war crimes" to become collaborators
with the United States,7 the Japanese human experimenters were relatively
anonymous. American policymakers could thus partner with the implicated
Japanese officials with little fear of a public-relations backlash.
After being granted immunity, some Japanese who participated in the
medical experiments went on to assume prominent roles in postwar Japanese
society. They acquired senior positions in the health ministry, academia, and
the private sector.' U.S. officials, motivated by a desire to build an alliance with
postwar Japan to combat communism, allegedly were aware that these Japanese
sought important positions and may have even helped them obtain their jobs.9
5. See, e.g., C.A. WILLOUGHBY, REPORT ON BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE (1947) (on
file with The Yale Law & Policy Review); Letter from C.A. Willoughby, U.S. Army
Forces, Pac., Military Intelligence Section, Gen. Staff, to Major Gen. S.J. Cham-
berlin, Dir. of Intelligence, War Dep't Gen. Staff (July 22, 1947) (on file with The
Yale Law & Policy Review).
6. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 2, at 72-74; GOLD, supra note 2, at 86-143; HARRIS, su-
pra note 1, at 147-233; THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: AN INTERNATIONAL SYM-
POSIUM 85-86, 131, 134 (Chihiro Hosoya et al. eds., 1986); Awaya Kentar6, In the
Shadows of the Tokyo Tribunal, in THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL: AN IN-
TERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 79, 85-86 (C. Hosoya et al. eds., 1986); B.V.A. Roling,
The Tokyo Trial and the Quest for Peace, in THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL:
AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM, supra, at 125, 131, 134; Shane Green, The Asian
Hell of Unit 731, AGE (Melbourne, Australia), Aug. 29, 2002, at ii; Kyodo, US Paid
for Japanese Human Germ Warfare Data, AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORA-
TION, Aug. 15, 2005, http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/2oo5o8/s1437314.htm;
Justin McCurry, Japan's Sins of the Past, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 28, 2004,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/ournalist/story/o,7792,1338296,oo.html.
7. JOHN LOFTUS & MARK AARONS, THE SECRET WAR AGAINST THE JEWS: How
WESTERN ESPIONAGE BETRAYED THE JEWISH PEOPLE 290 (1994).
8. GOLD, supra note 2, at 139-43; WILLIAMS & WALLACE, supra note 2, at 235-42.
9. GOLD, supra note 2, at 139-43; WILLIAMS & WALLACE, supra note 2, at 236.
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Thus, the U.S. government made a conscious decision not to hold account-
able thousands of Japanese suspected of direct involvement in some of the most
horrific crimes of World War II, including those who participated in offenses
allegedly planned and perpetrated against Americans. The incipient Cold War,
and the superpowers' attendant desire to secure competitive advantages, had
chilled the U.S. government's enthusiasm for investigating and prosecuting
Japanese human experimenters. U.S. officials believed that their research would
be useful in the arms race developing between the United States and the Soviet
Union. U.S. war memorials and history books gloss over these facts.
B. Recent Developments
In recent years, Japanese nationalism and revisionism have grown, particu-
larly about the country's wartime atrocities." For example, early in his term,
Shinzo Abe, who served as the Japanese prime minister from September 2006 to
September 2007, erroneously claimed that there was no evidence that Japan
employed sexual slavery during World War II." Meanwhile, Japan has steadily
increased its military spending, despite having been constitutionally barred
since the end of World War II from maintaining its own "land, sea, and air
forces."'" In 2007, Japan spent the equivalent of $41.75 billion on its military, the
sixth largest annual military budget of any country in the world. 3
Japan's changing attitudes and capabilities have alarmed its neighbors, par-
ticularly China and Korea, which suffered numerous atrocities at the hands of
the Japanese in World War I1.'4 As I have argued elsewhere, Japan's failure to
acknowledge the atrocities it has committed casts uncertainty over its recent
military resurgence. To assuage the fears of China, Korea, and other countries
1o. See, e.g., Howard W. French, Specter of a Rearmed Japan Stirs Its Wartime Genera-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 20ol, at Ai; Francis Fukuyama, The Trouble with Japa-
nese Nationalism, PROJECT SYNDICATE, 2007, http://www.project-syndicate.org/
commentary/fukuyama2; Shane Green, Japan's Lack of Remorse Troubling as It
Manoeuvres to Rearm, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June 19, 2003, at 15; Norimitsu
Onishi, Long After War Trials, Japan Still Honors a Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31,
2007, at A4; George F. Will, Editorial, The Uneasy Sleep of Japan's Dead, WASH.
POST, Aug. 20, 2006, at B07; Paul Wiseman, Nationalism Gains Strength in Japan,
USA TODAY, July 27, 2007, at 6A.
11. See, e.g., Editorial, No Comfort, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007, at A2o; Norimitsu On-
ishi, Denial Reopens Wounds of Japan's Ex-Sex Slaves, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2007, at
Ai; Norimitsu Onishi, Premier's Sudden Resignation Leaves Japan in Disarray, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2007, at A3; Editorial, Shinzo Abe's Double Talk, WASH. POST,
Mar. 24, 2007, at A16.
12. KENP6, art. 9, para. 2.
13. Global Security, World Wide Military Expenditures, http://www.globalsecu
rity.org/military/world/spending.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2008).
14. See, e.g., French, supra note 10; see also Green, supra note io.
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in the Pacific Rim-where memories of a brutal, imperialistic Japanese gov-
ernment remain vivid-modern-day Japan should both acknowledge and
apologize for the atrocities its military perpetrated in World War II. Japan's
neighbors will, in part, look to how the current Japanese government treats the
crimes of previous Japanese regimes to interpret how Japan will manage its
newfound military might in the years to come.'"
In addition to the practical benefits for Japan's diplomatic relations, the
Japanese government should come to grips with its past for ethical reasons, out
of respect for survivors, victims, and their families. Other governments have re-
cently issued apologies for their past wrongs, recognizing that doing so is a nec-
essary first step on the path towards reconciliation and achieving long-term
peace and stability. 6
At the same time, other countries, including the United States, could do
more to help establish an accurate record not only of Japanese atrocities but
also of the postwar authorities who were able but unwilling to punish them. 7
The door is therefore open to a new U.S. policy, grounded in morality, which
acknowledges the United States' politically expedient cover-up of Japanese war-
time atrocities. Just as Japan's leaders should be more forthcoming about their
dark past, so too should the United States recognize that it was complicit in hid-
ing that shameful affair. A change in U.S. policy may even help motivate a
change in Japan's.
II. A PEOPLE'S TRIBUNAL AS A MEANS To EXAMINE PAST ATROCITIES
Even if acknowledging Japanese wartime atrocities is sound policy, the real-
ity is that the United States and Japan may continue to be silent about their re-
15. See Zachary D. Kaufman, Recent Development, No Right to Fight: The Modern
Implications of Japan's Pacifist Postwar Constitution, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 266 (2008).
16. For example, on February 13, 2008, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd offi-
cially apologized for past wrongs committed by his country's government against
Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders. As part of his apology statement, Rudd de-
clared, "The Parliament is today here assembled to deal with this unfinished busi-
ness of the nation, to remove a great stain from the nation's soul, and in a true
spirit of reconciliation to open a new chapter in the history of this great land, Aus-
tralia." Tim Johnston, Australia Says "Sorry" to Aborigines for Mistreatment, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2008, at A14 (quoting Rudd). The offenses some Aborigine rights
advocates claim the Australian government committed against Aborigines include
human experimentation, particularly on children. See, e.g., Aborigines "Used in
Experiments," BBC NEws, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7348144.stm
(last visited Apr. 15, 2008).
17. To be sure, the U.S. government has taken some steps to address Japan's wartime
human experimentation. In December 1996, the U.S. Department of Justice's Of-
fice of Special Investigations announced that it had added to its watch list of
atrocity perpetrators banned from entering the United States sixteen Japanese vet-
erans of World War II, which included some participants in Unit 731. See BEIGBE-
DER, supra note 2, at 73.
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spective involvement in human experimentation during World War II. Absent
government action, civil society should pursue alternative means of obtaining
official acknowledgement. Because the particular circumstances and challenges
of confronting Japanese wartime human experimentation limit the appropri-
ateness and practicality of the most common transitional justice mechanisms,"
a more innovative-or at least more unusual-approach is required.
A so-called "people's tribunal," an ad hoc organization of private citizens,
may offer the most promising method of addressing the atrocities. Beyond ex-
pressing general outrage, non-governmental actors can assemble to create a fo-
rum to register public protest about state actions. Such civil society members
can draw upon their particular backgrounds and expertise in order to provide
analysis and recommend remedies for violations of international law.' 9 Un-
doubtedly, people's tribunals have significant drawbacks: their history and op-
eration demonstrate the potential pitfalls of civil society's attempt to provide
reconciliation, retribution, or restitution for past crimes. However, these insti-
tutions present the best-perhaps the only-means for addressing Japanese
human experimentation in World War II.
A. Background and Critique of People's Tribunals
It is difficult to catalogue all of the people's tribunals, as they have taken a
wide variety of forms and have been created for multifarious purposes. By some
accounts, the first people's tribunals originated during the interwar period in
response to perceived inefficiencies in the rule of law at the time. Private citi-
zens established panels to examine the 1933 fire that damaged the Reichstag, the
Parliament building in Berlin in what was then Nazi Germany, as well as to con-
front the mid-193os Moscow show trials, part of the "Great Purge" in the Soviet
Union. In both cases, prominent Americans, including attorney Arthur Garfield
Hays and public intellectual John Dewey, promoted and participated in the
people's tribunals.20 Throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries,
18. See infra Part III.
19. See, e.g., Jost E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS As LAW-MAKERS
(2005); ANNA-KARIN LINDBLOM, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW (2006); Farouk Mawlawi, New Conflicts, New Challenges: The
Evolving Role for Non-Governmental Actors, 46 J. INT'L AFF. 391 (1993).
20. ARTHUR JAY KLINGHOFFER & JUDITH APTER KLINGHOFFER, INTERNATIONAL CITI-
ZENS' TRIBUNALS: MOBILIZING PUBLIC OPINION TO ADVANCE HUMAN RIGHTS 11-
101 (2002). The first people's tribunal the Klinghoffers identify was named the
Commission of Inquiry into the Origins of the Reichstag Fire, also known as the
International Juridical Investigatory Commission on the Reichstag Fire. This peo-
ple's tribunal held hearings in London from September 14 through September 18,
1933, and announced its "final conclusions" two days later. KLINGHOFFER &
KLINGHOFFER, supra, at 21-25. The second people's tribunal the Klinghoffers iden-
tify was named the Preliminary Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made
against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials, also known as the Dewey Commis-
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people's tribunals have been organized to address a range of alleged violations
of international law, from U.S. involvement in Vietnam to the rights of asylum
seekers, psychiatric patients, and indigenous peoples.
But no matter the form, the greatest strength of people's tribunals is that,
precisely because they are driven by civil society and are thus, unlike state-
sanctioned courts and truth commissions, independent from political authori-
ties, they may be more willing and better able to reveal damning information
and to present critical findings and recommendations. 2 A report of a people's
tribunal's hearings and conclusions can be disseminated either by the tribunal
itself or by news agencies, thus raising public awareness about the tribunal's op-
erations and the subject matter of its inquiries.
A people's tribunal may therefore provide compelling shaming pressures,22
much like other features of international law and politics. 3 As political scientist
Andrew Moravscik argues in a case study of the European human rights regime,
shaming
seeks to enforce individual human rights and promote democracy by
creating an international and domestic climate of opinion critical of
national practices. Shaming exploits the symbolic legitimacy of foreign
pressure and international institutions ... [and] is instigated through
the dissemination of information ... and exploitation of international
practical institutions .... 14
That shaming function, which Moravscik found in E.U. institutions, is also in-
dicative of a people's tribunal. As Arthur Jay Klinghoffer and Judith Apter
sion, after its chairman, John Dewey. This people's tribunal held hearings in Co-
yoacdn, outside Mexico City, from April lo through April 17, 1937; released a tran-
script of those hearings and summary of findings on September 21, 1937; and an-
nounced its verdict in New York on December 12, 1937. KLINGHOFFER &
KLINGHOFFER, supra, at 72-73, 8o-82, 96-97.
21. For general discussion of such tribunals created and staffed by civil society, see
KLINGHOFFER & KLINGHOFFER, supra note 20; Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, Interna-
tional Citizens' Tribunals on Human Rights, in GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND THE
WEST 346 (Adam Jones ed., 2004). The Klinghoffers provide the most thorough
treatment of this developing area of scholarship.
22. Professors Dan Kahan and Eric Posner define shaming as the "process by which
citizens publicly and self consciously draw attention to the bad dispositions or ac-
tions of an offender, as a way of punishing him for having those dispositions or
engaging in those actions." Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-
Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L.
& EcoN. 365,368 (1999).
23. See, e.g., ROBERT F. DRINAN, THE MOBILIZATION OF SHAME (2001); Lesley Wexler,
The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses, and Norm Entre-
preneurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine Ban Treaty, 20
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 561, 563-67 (2003).
24. Andrew Moravcsik, Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal The-
ory and Western Europe, 1 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 157, 161 (1995).
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Klinghoffer state in their extensive study of people's tribunals, such institutions
"can ... serve as a corrective mechanism through which public intellectuals
mobilize world public opinion against powerful countries shielded from sanc-
tions under international law. If the absence of effective and permanent legal
structures is the problem, then [people's] tribunals may offer an appropriate
solution."25
To be sure, commentators have levied substantial criticism against people's
tribunals. One major critique concerns their nomenclature, as the term "peo-
ple's tribunal" is controversial. For some, the first word is reminiscent of "to-
talitarian and terrorist concepts of justice," leading the Klinghoffers, for in-
stance, to refer to these institutions instead as "international citizens'
tribunals."26 The second word, "tribunal," suggests a juridical function, but, as
the Klinghoffers observe, "[a]pplying legalistic terminology is often confound-
ing,"27 as these civil society initiatives employ staff and methods that depart
from traditional notions of courtroom procedure.
Indeed, people's tribunals have often been criticized for their mechanics.
First, they have lacked generally accepted guarantees of due process. Some tri-
bunals, for example, have conducted hearings in absentia and have relied on
hasty and possibly predetermined deliberations." Second, because people's tri-
bunals are often created, staffed, and defended by famous liberal Western pro-
fessors and philosophers-Simone de Beauvoir, Richard Falk, Bertrand Russell,
and Jean-Paul Sartre, for example-these institutions have been dismissed as
Eurocentric, elitist, left-leaning, and radical.2 9 Third, many people's tribunals
have focused on atrocities, including genocide, allegedly committed by the
United States,3 leading some to criticize these institutions as politically moti-
25. KLINGHOFFER & KLINGHOFFER, supra note 20, at 5.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. at 9.
28. See, e.g., id. at 5, 8.
29. See, e.g., id. at 1, 5-7, 10, 103-62, 163, 165, 171. For the inaugural statement to the first
Russell Tribunal by Jean-Paul Sartre, who served as its executive president, see
Jean-Paul Sartre, Inaugural Statement to the Russell Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal
(1966), in GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND THE WEST, supra note 21, at 181.
30. For example, the first Russell Tribunal, established in 1966, charged the United
States with committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in
Vietnam, and found the United States guilty of violating international law
through aggression, targeting civilians, and using prohibited weapons. Later peo-
ple's tribunals focused on U.S. involvement in, among other places, Guatemala,
Hawaii, Iraq, Nicaragua, and Panama. See KLINGHOFFER & KLINGHOFFER, supra
note 20, at 1, 4, 7-8, 103-77; CAROLINE MOOREHEAD, BERTRAND RUSSELL: A BIOG-
RAPHY 520-30 (1993); Sally Engle Merry, Resistance and the Cultural Power of the
Law, 29 L. & Soc'Y REV. 11, 20-23 (1995). For Russell's views on American respon-
sibility for the Vietnam War, which informed his decision to establish the first
Russell Tribunal, see BERTRAND RUSSELL, WAR CRIMES IN VIETNAM (1967).
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vated and anti-American.' Because of past people's tribunals' procedural de-
fects and thinly-veiled political agendas, some may therefore consider people's
tribunals to be kangaroo courts rather than legitimate, fair quasi-judicial insti-
tutions.
The greatest criticism of people's tribunals may be their inherent lack of an
enforcement mechanism. People's tribunals share the same impotence as truth
commissions, which "hold fewer powers than do courts. They have no powers
to put anyone in jail, they can't enforce their recommendations ... ." " In fact,
people's tribunals may be even less powerful than truth commissions, as many
truth commissions have been sanctioned by the state and thus have "had the
power to compel anyone to come forward to answer questions." 3 As Russell ac-
knowledged of his first eponymous tribunal, "Our tribunal.., commands no
State power. It rests on no victorious army. It claims no other than a moral au-
thority."34 Because they have no teeth, people's tribunals have been largely inef-
fective, and they have been accused of being nothing more than political activ-
ism cloaked in legal imagery. Indeed, as even neutral commentators such as
Wellesley College professor Sally Engle Merry have recognized, people's tribu-
nals often "appropriate[] legal forms and symbols in an effort to harness the
power and legitimacy of law in a movement of resistance."35
Yet proponents of people's tribunals respond that they can succeed de-
spite-or perhaps because of-some of their flaws. As Arthur Jay Klinghoffer
argues,
International citizens' tribunals cannot impose their decisions upon
transgressing states, but this apparent weakness may be turned into an
advantage, at least in theory. Such tribunals are not indebted to states,
and are not influenced by them. Powerlessness may thus prove to be a
virtue, and contribute to [international citizens'] tribunals' legiti-
macy. 3
6
Furthermore, given that so many critiques of people's tribunals derive from
their design and operation, many of those criticisms could be addressed
through more careful planning, as I suggest below.
B. Application to Japanese Wartime Human Experimentation
A people's tribunal was used once before to respond to Japanese wartime
atrocities. In 2ooo, a Women's International War Crimes Tribunal (WIWCT)
31. See, e.g., KLINGHOFFER & KLINGHOFFER, supra note 2o, at 7, 134, 178.
32. PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF
TRUTH COMMISSIONS 16 (2002).
33. Id.
34. RUSSELL, supra note 30, at 125.
35. Merry, supra note 30, at 21.
36. Klinghoffer, supra note 21, at 347.
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on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery was held in Tokyo to establish the history of,
and recommend action on, Japan's use of "comfort women" during World
War II. This people's tribunal was organized and staffed exclusively by indi-
viduals acting in their private capacities, including Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, a
distinguished U.S. jurist. 8 The WIWCT was designed to supplement the Inter-
national Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), which the Allied victors of
World War II held in Tokyo from 1946 to 1948 to try the perpetrators of Japan's
most egregious wartime atrocities. The IMTFE was insufficient because, among
other flaws, it failed to include rape, sexual enslavement, and other sexual
crimes in the litany of Japanese atrocities it confronted. 9
Because the IMTFE also failed to address Japan's human experimentation,4
a people's tribunal should be convened for those crimes as well. Civil society
should demand the declassification of documents about human experimenta-
tion, including information about which Japanese officials were involved in
these activities and the Allied forces' decision not to seek the trial of Ishii or his
cohorts before the IMTFE or other postwar courts. Civil society should also
37. "Comfort women" is the euphemistic term for the tens of thousands of women,
the majority of whom were from China and Korea, whom the Japanese forced
into prostitution and sexual slavery during World War II. See, e.g., GEORGE
HICKS, THE COMFORT WOMEN: JAPAN'S BRUTAL REGIME OF ENFORCED PROSTI-
TUTION IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1994); DAI SIL KIM-GIBSON, SILENCE BRO-
KEN: KOREAN COMFORT WOMEN (1999); LEGACIES OF THE COMFORT WOMEN OF
WORLD WAR II (Margaret Stetz & Bonnie B. C. Oh eds., 2001); YUKI TANAKA, JA-
PAN'S COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL SLAVERY AND PROSTITUTION DURING WORLD
WAR II AND THE US OCCUPATION (2002); TRUE STORIES OF THE KOREAN COM-
FORT WOMEN (Keith Howard ed., Young Joo Lee trans., 1995); YOSHIMI YOSHI-
AKI, COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL SLAVERY IN THE JAPANESE MILITARY DURING
WORLD WAR II (Suzanne O'Brien, trans., Columbia University Press 2ooo)
(1995).
38. McDonald currently serves as an arbitrator on the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. She
is a former judge on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas and
the former president (chief judge) of the United Nations International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
39. See KLINGHOFFER & KLINGHOFFER, supra note 20, at 166-67; The Women's Inter-
national War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery, Violence
Against Women in War-Network Japan, http://www.jca.apc.org/vaww-net-
japan/english/womenstribunal2ooo/whatstribunal.html (last visited Apr. 15,
2oo8); see also, e.g., Christine M. Chinkin, Editorial Comments, Women's Interna-
tional Tribunal on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery, 95 Am. J. INT'L L. 335 (2001);
Christine Chinkin, Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International Law, 5 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 326 (1994); Hirohito "Guilty" Over Sex Slaves, BBC NEws, Dec. 12, 2000,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/lo66658.stm; Stacy Sullivan, Sym-
bolic War Crimes Tribunal for Japanese "Comfort Women," Dec. 10, 2002,
http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/comfort.html.
40. BEIGBEDER, supra note 2, at 73.
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demand a full and public apology by Japan for carrying out-and by the United
States for covering up--these horrendous events.
If private citizens do pursue such an initiative, the aforementioned criti-
cisms of people's tribunals could be addressed in the process. The initiative
should be referred to as a "commission of inquiry" or something similarly de-
scriptive of its extrajudicial nature. Efforts should be made to have a fair and
balanced group of panelists that, if possible, includes individuals from across
the political spectrum and from several different countries, including China,
both North and South Korea, and Japan itself. The Japanese government should
be afforded the opportunity to present a defense. The panelists should take that
defense and all other evidence into consideration before arriving at their conclu-
sion. That conclusion should not be a "verdict," but rather a statement of find-
ings and should include any dissenting views among the panelists. By virtue of
its primary focus on Japan, even though the matter considered involves the
United States, the institution would not necessarily be deemed anti-American.
Of course, neither Japan nor the United States would be obligated to ac-
knowledge the findings or follow the recommendations of such a grassroots ini-
tiative. Still, a people's tribunal could help raise public awareness about Japa-
nese wartime human experimentation, and it could pressure Japan and the
United States finally to take responsibility for their actions. Indeed, Japan would
be especially susceptible to the shaming function of a people's tribunal, as Japa-
nese society is more sensitive to shame than many other cultures. 41 Moreover, as
Japan seeks greater involvement in international affairs-for example, through
its ongoing campaign to obtain a permanent seat on the United Nations Secu-
rity Council (UNSC) 4 -- Japan is likely to be increasingly concerned about its
public image.
III. A COURT OF LAST RESORT? WHY OTHER TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE OPTIONS
WOULD NOT WORK
Beyond the possible effectiveness of shaming Japan and the United States
into finally publicly addressing Japanese human experimentation during World
War II, a people's tribunal might also be the most appropriate transitional jus-
tice mechanism in this case simply because other options would be unsuccessful
or impractical. While a process of elimination is perhaps not always the most
desirable means of arriving at a conclusion or recommendation, in this case it is
an honest and realistic one. Implementing a people's tribunal, even with its sig-
nificant controversy and weaknesses, is better than the current situation of inac-
41. For one of the seminal works describing Japan as "a shame culture," see RUTH
BENEDICT, THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD: PATTERNS OF JAPANESE
CULTURE (1946).
42. In September 2004, Japan began actively campaigning to secure a permanent seat
on the United Nations Security Council. See Timeline: Japan, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/1261918.stm (last visited Apr. 15,
2008).
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tion. In this Part, I discuss why transitional justice options besides a people's
tribunal would be unlikely to address effectively Japanese wartime human ex-
perimentation.
International criminal tribunals, if formally and officially established by
recognized authorities such as international organizations, can have large budg-
ets and staffs, widespread legitimacy, binding judgments, and strong enforce-
ment mechanisms.43 For example, the United Nations (UN) International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) had a two-year budget for
2oo6 to 2007 of $276,474,100 and, as of October 1, 2007, had 1,173 staff members
representing eighty-two nationalities." The ICTY was established by the UNSC
using its Chapter VII powers as outlined in the UN Charter 45-the first interna-
tional war crimes tribunal so created. Consequently, the ICTY has the official
imprimatur and support of the UNSC, the division of the UN charged with
"primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity,' ' 46 in its existence, operation, and working relationship with all state mem-
bers of the UN (effectively the entire world). 47
However, such international tribunals have always had limited temporal,
subject-matter, personal, and territorial jurisdictions. For instance, the compe-
tence of the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), estab-
lished by the UNSC to address the 1994 genocide,4s is confined to prosecuting
"persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens
responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of
neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 ... ,,49 Nei-
ther the ICTR nor any other existing ad hoc war crimes tribunal could have ju-
risdiction over Japanese wartime atrocities.
The jurisdictional constraints on even existing permanent international tri-
bunals preclude them from trying cases concerning Japanese human experi-
mentation during World War II. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), "the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations,"" can try cases only between
43. See generally HOWARD BALL, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE
TWENTIETH-CENTURY ExPERIENCE (1999); GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE
HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS (2000); BEIG-
BEDER, supra note 2; RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY: REFLECTIONS OF A
WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATOR (2000).
44. ICTY-General Information, http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 15, 2008).
45. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
46. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1.
47. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 45, 5 4.
48. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
49. Id. 5 1.
50. U.N. Charter art. 92.
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states,"' and thus individual Japanese could not come under its jurisdiction. It is
also unclear whether the ICJ would have jurisdiction over crimes such as these,
which were committed before the court was established as part of the UN in
1945.5' The International Criminal Court (ICC), the world's first permanent in-
ternational war crimes tribunal, would be a similarly inapplicable forum. Al-
though Japan is a state party to the Rome Statute, the treaty that established the
ICC, 3 and therefore the ICC could have jurisdiction over atrocities committed
in Japan or by Japanese, 4 the ICC's temporal jurisdiction extends back only to
July 1, 2002, the date on which the ICC entered into force."
But even an ad hoc war crimes tribunal created specifically to address these
atrocities would likely not be effective. Such tribunals, which establish an his-
torical account of atrocities and impose sentences on convicted defendants,
usually require alleged perpetrators of crimes to be in custody, 6 and often the
accused choose to testify.57 In the case of Japan's wartime human experimenta-
tion, most, if not all, suspected offenders are likely to have died, while old age,
poor health, or the passing of six decades may cloud the memories of those who
are still alive. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the ad
hoc hybrid war crimes tribunal recently created to address the Cambodian
51. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031,
1059.
52. See generally SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE TIME FACTOR IN THE JURISDICTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1960).
53. Japan acceded to the Rome Statute on July 17, 2007. International Criminal Court:
Japan, http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/statesparties/country&id=io9.html (last visited
Apr. 15, 2oo8).
54. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12, adopted and opened
for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
55. See Marlise Simons, Without Fanfare or Cases International Court Sets Up, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2002, at A3. The Rome Statute provides: "The Court has jurisdiction
only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute."
Rome Statute, supra note 54, at art. ii, para. 1.
56. For example, the ICTY and the ICTR both provide that the accused shall be enti-
tled to be tried in his/her presence and to defend him/herself in person or through
his/her own chosen legal assistance. Statute of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda art. 2o, para. 4 (d), Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1602; Statute of the Interna-
tional Tribunal art. 21, para. 4 (d), May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192.
57. Saddam Hussein is only the latest prominent alleged atrocity perpetrator to testify
at his own trial. See Edward Wong, Hussein Urges Iraqis to Unifr in War on U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2006, at Al. Another accused war criminal who recently tes-
tified at his own trial before he died was Slobodan Milosevic. See Gary J. Bass,
Milosevic in The Hague, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2003, at 82.
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genocide of 1975 to 1979,58 suffers from these very problems, even though the
crimes it covers occurred decades after World War 11.1 9
For the same reason, a truth and reconciliation commission, as most fa-
mously implemented in South Africa6° (but also used elsewhere in Africa, Latin
America, Europe, Asia, and even recently in the United States),6' would be
problematic. Priscilla Hayner, an expert on truth commissions, suggests that
a truth commission may have any or all of the following five basic
aims: to discover, clarify, and formally acknowledge past abuses; to re-
spond to specific needs of victims; to contribute to justice and account-
ability; to outline institutional responsibility and recommend reforms;
and to promote reconciliation and reduce conflict over the past.
62
Such commissions, which sometimes offer amnesty in exchange for truthful tes-
timony, are most successful when they are sanctioned by the state in which they
operate, engage alleged perpetrators and victims of crimes over which they have
58. Professor Laura Dickinson describes "hybrid" tribunals as those for which "both
the institutional apparatus and the applicable law consist of a blend of the inter-
national and the domestic. Foreign judges sit alongside their domestic counter-
parts to try cases prosecuted and defended by teams of local lawyers working with
those from other countries. The judges apply domestic law that has been re-
formed to accord with international standards." Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise
of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 295 (2003).
59. See, e.g., Editorial, The Killing Fields, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2006, at A20 ("[Because]
the leaders of the Khmer Rouge are either old or dead... [w] e can only hope that
there will be enough of a trial in the end to give Cambodia's survivors some sense
of justice done.").
60. See generally ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED: INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA'S
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (2000); HAYNER, supra note 32, at 40-
45; TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (Robert I. Rot-
berg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000); DESMOND MPILO TUTU, No FUTURE
WITHOUT FORGIVENESS (1999); Timothy Garton Ash, True Confessions, 44 N.Y.
REV. BOOKS, July 17, 1997, at 33.
61. See generally JON ELSTER, CLOSING THE BOOKS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN HIS-
TORICAL PERSPECTIVE 62-66, 70-72, 196, 215 (2004); MARK FREEMAN, TRUTH
COMMISSIONS AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 3-87 (2006); HAYNER, supra note 32, at
32-40, 45-71; MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 52-90 (1998); RUTI G. TEITEL,
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 69-117 (2000); 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING
DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 223-333 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995);
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Strategies of International Justice 28 INT'L SECURITY, Winter 2003-04, at 5, 31-33;
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jurisdiction, and function in the shadow of prosecution.6 3 However, given the
recent resurgence of Japanese nationalism and the dubious availability of com-
petent witnesses to or perpetrators of these heinous crimes, none of these con-
ditions would be likely to apply in the case of Japanese human experimentation
during World War II.
CONCLUSION
This Comment illustrates the reality that legal responses to atrocities may
not always be appropriate, practical, or effective. Political solutions, including
those pursued by civil society, may be the only alternative. Even though such
entities may be controversial and lack the ability or authority to investigate,
prosecute, or punish, they can command the attention of the public-
particularly as information-disseminating and shaming mechanisms-and pos-
sibly achieve those ends.
Justice for those who suffered Japanese human experimentation during
World War II is long overdue. Though even a people's tribunal could not pro-
vide full accountability for the perpetrators or reconciliation for the victims of
this atrocity, it could at least help promote greater historical awareness and ac-
knowledgement about the respective roles of Japan and the United States in this
horrific crime. A people's tribunal on Japanese human experimentation offers a
means of addressing the past while promoting reconciliation among peoples
and states for the future.
63. Id. at 1-9, 14, 239-40.

